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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF VENNA DARLENE 
BERM, Deceased. EDWARD C. 
BERM. 
Protestant arnd Respondent, 
vs. 
AL~IA GEE, personally, and as 
administrator of the Estate of 
Verma Darlene Behm, Deceased, 
Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RE,SPONDENT 
CAsE No. 
7305 
ADDITIONS TO STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In what the appellant terms the ''Statement of 
Facts", there are many things omitted or passed over 
lightly, which the res,pondent feels should be brought to 
the attention of this court. 
On page three of appellant's brief, the appellant 
sets out that the District Court of Salt Lake County 
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authorized the administrator to make a settlement in the 
sum of $15,000.00 and to ·pay therefrom to his attorney, 
Shirley P. Jones, the sum of $3,750.00 attorney's fees 
''solely for services rendered in making and securing 
said settlement''. Respondent feels that attention should 
be called to paragraph three of the petition of Alma Gee 
(R. 11-13), wherein he petitioned the court for authority 
to settle the ease against Doctor Holbrook and allowance 
for attorney's fees. 
''That through the efforts of your petitioner's 
attorney, Shirley P. Jones, the said Dr. Von G. 
Holbrook has offered to pay to your petitioner 
for the benefit of the estate * * * '' 
That on page five of appellant's brief it states the 
administrator then petitioned the court ''for distribution 
to himself by virtue of the said 'Assignment' and to 
the said minors, or in the alternative that he be allowed 
a quantum meruit for his services in the event the other 
distribution should be denied.'' 
The res1pondent feels that the court should have its 
attention called to the fact that on the 23rd day of April, 
1948, Alma Gee was cited into court to show cause why 
he should not be required to disburse immediately the 
$11,250.00 set forth in the petition to the heirs of the 
deceased, and further to show cause why this court 
should not declare the pretended assignment of April 28, 
1947, to be null and void and of no effect (R. 22), and 
that on the day it came on for hearing, to-wit, April 27, 
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1948, Attorney Jones served on res·pondent 's attorneys 
objections to citation claiming: 
1. That it appeared that Edward C. Behm was not 
interested in the matter. 
2. That the matters set forth in the petition for 
order to show eause are not matters that can be deter-
mined in probate. 
3. That it appeared from the petition that Behm 
had no interest in the matter, and that if he claims to 
have an interest, he should be required to proceed under 
the code of civil procedure. 
4. That the citation and ipetition for order to show 
cause are not the proper methods of procedure to deter-
mine the matters and things set forth in the petition for 
order to show cause. 
5. That citation in probate cannot replace a sum-
mons and cannot be a substitute therefor. 
6. That it appeared that Behm would contest any 
petition for distribution and that the court could not 
determine the distributees or the amount of distribution 
unless and until a determination of the rights of Edward 
C. Behm had been made in a proper proceeding brought 
for that purpose. 
7. That Alma Gee individually or personally was 
not before the ·court in this rproceeding and his rights 
cannot be determined therein. 
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That said matter was taken under advisement by 
the Honorable J. Allan Crockett, and that on the 20th 
day of May, 1948, he entered his o"rder overruling objec-
tions to the citation and ordered that Alma Gee be and 
appear before the court ten days after notice. That this 
notice was served on the 16th day of August, 1948, on 
Attorney Jones and was made returnable the lOth day 
of September, 1948, and that the said Alma Gee then 
did not, as set forth in ap~pellant 's brief on page five, 
merely ask that the court distribute to himself by virtue 
of assignment and the minors, or in the alternative that 
he be allowed a quantum meruit for his services in the 
event the other distribution be denied, but that he also 
filed a complete final report and account and petition for 
distribution and discharge, which set out practically 
everything usually put out in closing of a decedent's 
estate, except . as to having the vouchers of the last 
illness and funeral expenses attached. It set out the 
costs, which included publication of notice to creditors 
and other matters. That it set out in the petition that 
1petitioner had on hand in cash the balance of $11,218.80 
for distribution to himself as guardian of said minors, 
and to himself personally as assignee of said Behm, 
and that he set out in said petition that he was entitled 
to a fee as administrator or trustee, in addition to his 
assigned share, in the sum of $460.00, and he had arranged 
with Attorney Shirley P. Jones to accept the sum of 
$500.00 for his fee in the estate matter and also for his 
fee in the guardianship matter in the estates of said 
minors. He set forth that the ~p~etition of Behm to set 
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aside the assignment was ""ithout merit, sham and false, 
and he, Gee, 'vas entitled to the reasonable value of his 
services, and that the services consist of the aforesaid 
guardianship proceedings, the suit against Von G. Hol-
brook, and that said services are reasonably "\Vorth the 
sum of $4,210.00, which he was willing to reduce to 
$460.00 upon receiving one-third of the aforesaid 
$11,218.80. 
ADDITIONS TO TESTIMONY 
The appellant in presenting the testimony at the 
hearing has_ stressed parts of the evidence and passed 
over much other evidence and omitted some entirely; so, 
the respondent at this time will submit the following for 
the court's attention: 
Alma Gee was sixty-three years old (R. 130). He 
works for wages for the Kearns Corporation as a guard 
and receives $150.00 'Per month. He took the money, the 
$11,250.00, and deposited it in the bank and took it out 
on the advice of Attorney Larson (R. 136) ; he put the 
moneys in various places in his house, in his locker, and 
he paid Mr. Larson $200.00 (R. 137-8). 
Mr. Gee first stated he did not know how much 
money he had left (R. 132). The court several times had 
to insist that Mr. Gee tell about the money. The first 
time (R. 132), up,on demand of counsel for Behm that 
Mr. Gee bring the money into court, Mr. Jones stated: 
"MR. JONES: At this time, I assumed this 
money was in Continental National Bank and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
G 
Trust Company in deposits in the name of the 
guardian. ' ' ( R. 133) 
Gee first received the money about the 8th of Janu-
ary, $15,000.00, and received a check from Jones. In 
April he withdrew the money because he did not think 
it was safe (R. 133-5). He said that he paid some bills, 
including $200.00 to Mr. Larson (R. 138). Mr. Gee could 
not tell whether he had spent $1,000.00, $2,000.00 or 
$5,000.00 of the money. The court again admonished 
Mr. Gee that he had better answer, at which time he 
said he thought there was $6,000.00 or $7,000.00 left of 
the money, and said he doubted if there ~as $7,000.00 
left. Mr. Gee stated that he knew he only had a $100.00 
bond up in the matter. The court again admonished Mr. 
Gee (R. 139). Again the court ordered Mr. Gee to.bring 
the money in by 2:00 o'clock (R. 140). 
Miss Beveridge, of the Continental National Bank, 
testified that the opening deposit by Mr. Gee was on 
January 28, 1948, of $5,000.00 and on May 7, 1948, 
there was a withdrawal of $4,999.00, leaving a balance 
of $1.00 which left the account open, and that on May 13, 
1948, there was a deposit of $11,250.00, m~king a balance 
of $11,251.00, and on June 30, 1948, a withdrawal of 
$11,250.00, leaving a balance of $1.00. 
After the noon recess, at 2 :00 o'clock, Mr. Gee again 
took the stand and stated that he had the $7,500.00 for 
the babies. Upon Mr. MeCarty's demand and the court's 
order, this $7,500.00 was given to the clerk and im-
pounded. About this time, Mr. Jones had great qualms 
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as to 'Yhether he "~as violating any of the canons of 
ethics of the American Bar Association, and after some 
discussion and assurance that his 'professional standing 
would not be lessened in any "\Yay, he decided to remain 
in the case, even though he were a witness, to 'vhich 
respondent's attorneys had and still have no objection. 
Mr. Gee remembered being in Judge Crockett's 
court on the 28th of April, 1948, on an order to show 
cause "~hy he should not be required to disburse the 
$11,250.00 and to show cause why the assignment, Ex-
hibit 6, should not be declared null and void ( R. 148), 
and thereafter, on May 7, 1948, he withdrew the money 
from the bank the first time. He put the money back in 
the bank on May 13, 1948 (R. 150). He had it out of the 
bank for six days. Upon the demands of Mr. McCarty 
to know what he had done with the balance of $3,750.00, 
he stated he had sp~ent $550.00 on his daughter, and upon 
demand as to where the rest of the money was, and upon 
the court telling him he was $3,000.00 shy, the witness 
shouted: 
''A. Give them the three thousand, and give 
them all if they want it all. 
'' Q. Have you the $3,000.00 here f 
"A. I have hoarded that money for ten 
months. I am sick of it. 
"THE COURT: Yes, I want you to give the 
money you have, to be divided. 
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''MR. McCARTY: May we have that counted 
and placed in-
" A. I hope that balances it. 
''THE COURT : Well, I was quite certain that 
that six thousand was going to be increased 
around here when we got down into it. That's 
why I wasn't very patient this morning.'' (R. 
153) 
Thereupon $3,000.00 more was paid into court. Mr. Gee 
testified that before this matter started he knew that if 
Behm had any idea there would be any big money re-
covered, he, Behm, would want part of it (R. 156). 
Gee admitted that when he signed the petition for 
discharge he had the sum of $11,218.80 for distribution, 
hut qualified himself by saying he signed it on the spur 
of the moment (R. 162). 
Mr. Larson's cross-examination brought out the 
fact that he, Larso11, had informed Mr. Gee that it was 
not a probate case (R. 163). 
That later, about the 22d or 24th of August, Gee 
retained Mr. Larson, and at that time he informed 
Attorney Larson that he was afraid Behm would attach 
part of the money, and that Larson told him to remove 
it to some other bank or take care of it in such a way 
that he would not attach it (R. 163). Gee testified that 
in discussing the suit with Behm he said, ''Let's go in 
partners, Ed'', and he said, ''No, I don't want anything 
to do with it at all" (R. 203). 
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Gee also testified that he told Behm he would see 
Mr. Jones and see what he says, and that when Behm 
would not go in with him on it, he said, ''When you 
give me 'permission to sue on this, then you are out of 
it" (R. 204). 
Shirley P. Jones was first called by protestant. Mr. 
Jones testified he only kne"\v Mr. Gee on this case. He 
did not know that he was employed as a watchman, and 
did not know what his position was except that he under-
stood Mr. Gee worked for the po,ver comp~any. 
Mr. Jones knew that when he gave him his check, 
Exhibit 9, a check for $11,250.00, payable to Alma Gee, 
administrator estate V enna Darlene Behm, that there 
was only a $100.00 bond up in each case, and knew that 
the bond was signed by Alma Gee's wife and one other 
member of the family. Mr. Jones testified that the court 
fixed the bond and the court knew about the settlement 
(R. 166-8). 
Witness Jones was called by the appellant. He first 
became interested in the case against Doctor Holbrook 
the last of February or the first of March, 1947, and the 
people that he talked to about the case were Mr. and 
Mrs. Gee ; in fact, they were the only people he talked 
to about the case (R. 179). The only time he talked 
to Mr. Behm was when he signed the petition on the 
11th of AJpril, 194 7. Mr. Jones testified that _there had 
been a lot of preliminary work getting the petitions for 
filing, and when they were ready Mr. Gee brought Mr. 
Behm in and introduced him to Attorney Jones, and 
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he gave Mr. Behm the pe~ition for ap~pointment of ad-
ministrator and the petition for appointment of guardian 
and asked Mr. Behm to read them, which he did. Mr. 
Jones asked him why he did not go ahead as adminis-
trator and why he did not go ahead as guardian, being 
the husband and father, and said he explained to him 
that he and the two twins were the only ones that could 
recover under the law. Behm replied that he did not 
want anything to do with it, and he said, ''If you sign 
these documents, you authorize Mr. Gee to take charge 
of the estate and to take charge of the property of the 
minors, and you are out", and Behm said, ''Yes, I 
understand that" (R. 182). Witness Jones could not 
remember the wording, but he said something was said 
by him or Mr. Gee that 1\fr. Gee was not willing to under-
take all this unless there was some assignment in the 
case, and it was as a result of the conversation in 
Attorney Jones' office that he drew the document, the 
assignment. 
Mr. Jones stated he took Behm in to Gordon Strong, 
a notary public, introduced him, and said, ''This is the 
father of the babies in the Holbrook case and the hus-
band, and he is signing away his rights to his father-
in-law, and I want you to notarize it", and Mr. Strong 
did. Attorney Jones denies that Behm ealled Mr. Langlois. 
Mr. Jones said that in November or December, after 
the attorneys for Doctor Holbrook wanted to settle the 
matter, that Behm came in, said he had some valuable 
evidence which consisted of a stateinent of some nurse 
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that they could get a hundred thousand dollars from 
Doctor Holbrook. Witness Jones said, ''This matter is 
going along all rig-ht", and Behm said, "Well, I am 
going to see the attorneys for Doctor Holbrook", and 
'Vitness Jones said, ''You stay away from the attorneys 
for Doctor Holbrook; you have nothing to do with this 
matter" (R. 183-A, not marked). He left and Attorney 
Jones never SR\Y him again until he came into his office 
with ~fr. Langlois. 
He did not ask Behm to come and see him. He had 
everything prepared before Behm came to his office 
except the assignment. He did not discuss the amount 
that Behm had put up for doctor bills. Mr. Jones, when 
asked 'vhether he treated this as an estate and gave 
notice to creditors, stated that he ~paid no attention to it; 
that there was no controversy; the only thing he wanted 
to have was an administrator appointed and bring a 
law suit. 
Mfl, Jones said that he prepared the final account and 
report and petition for distribution and discharge, and 
that he asked for $500.00 additional, that he figured that 
the estate and guardianship matters from the beginning 
to the conclusion were worth that (R .. 187). Then Mr. 
Jones testified: "I agreed with you that the trust com-
pany should be the one that would handle this mon,ey for 
the children and that that would be satisfactory with 
me" (R. 188). 
~vur Jones did not inform B·ehm there had been a 
$15,000.00 settlement. He did not see any occa'Sion to. 
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He treated the matter as an estate, hut did not inquire 
about funeral expenses (R. 188). Mr. Jones .never dis-
cussed with Gee who paid the funeral expenses and did 
not ask about them. He did not make any endeavor to 
find out whether or not they had been paid. ' 
'' Q. Did you feel it would be a fair assign-
ment for this man, if the bills had not been paid, 
that Mr. Behm should pay the bills and also turn 
over a third of what was recovered less your fee 
to Mr. Gee~ 
"A. I never thought anything about it, Mr. 
McCarty. Mr. Behm was completely disinterested 
in the whole thing. At the time it came to me, 
it didn't appear that there would be any recovery. 
"Q. Oh, it didn't appear at the time when 
he signed that petition, you didn't think there 
would be any recovery~ 
"A. I didn't say that. 
'' Q. Well, did you think there would be a re-
·Covery when he signed the petition for guardian 
and for administrator~ 
''A. I thought if there was any recovery and 
Mr. Gee did ·all the work and carried all the re-
sponsibility, that he should be p·rotected in it.'' 
Mlf• J one'S also testified that he told Behm that he was 
entitled to one-third of whatever was recovered; in fact, 
he said he read him the statute. Thereupon, counsel 
for respondent asked ·him to show the statute, that he 
would be interested in reading that statute that showed 
one-third. Whereupon Mr. Jones states, "It is the death 
statute of the p1ersonal representative and the heirs", 
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and said he interpreted it always that they share in th·e 
proportion that they are heirs. All papers were prepared 
for Mr. Behm when he came up to Attorney Jones' office 
except Exhibit 6, the assignment (R. 191-2). 
1yt ff I After the conference on the 11th, 
11 
Jones testified 
that he drew the assignment, gave it to Alma Gee to 
have Behm sign it, and bring it back. Mr. Jones testified 
as to all the consultations in his office with Mr. Gee. 
H~ did not give notice to Mr. Behm in the petition for 
permiS'sion to settle the claim. He said Mr. Behm was 
out of it (R. 199). 
ARGUMENT 
The respondent feels that he should discuss Point 
II out of order for the reason that if we have a clear 
understanding as to what is involved in this ca~e, we will 
make the remainder of the que'Stions much easier to 
dispose of. 
POINT II 
DISTRIBUTION AND PROPORTIONS OF DISTRIBUTION OF THE 
RECOVERY. 
It is obvious from the whole proceedings in this case 
that app,ellant was laboring under the impression that 
this was a probate action and that the action for wrong-
ful death belonged to the estate. The assignment, Ex-
hibit 6, attempts to assign an interest in an estate; the 
petition for permission to settle claims (R. 11-13), objec-
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tions to order to show cause ( R. 24-25), final report and 
account and petition for distribution and discharge 
(R. 31-34) all seem to be based on the assump·jon that 
this was a probate matter. Attorney Larson i11formed 
Mr. Gee that it was not a probate case (R. 163). It was 
evidently after Mr. Larson's entry into the case that 
the attorney for the appellant began to realize t:1at this 
was not a probate case. 
That the case for wrongful death is no part of a 
decedent's estate is the established law in Utah. Quoting 
from Morrison v. Perry, 104 U. 151, 140 P. (2) 772 at 
page 780: 
"It is undisputed in the evidence that de-
ceased's widow paid $819.40 for funeral services 
and that this amount was reasonable. There is, 
however, no evidence that the estate was in-
solvent, nor was there evidence to show whether 
or not the widow made a claim against the estate 
for reimbursement, or whether or not she was in 
fact reimbursed from the estate. If the widow 
was reimbursed from the estate was she damaged 
in this particular~ The answer is obviously no, 
if we keep in mind that the estate is separate. and 
distinct from the plaintiff or the statutory bene-
ficiaries in this action. The estate may be dam-
aged to that extent but the estate is not a party 
under our death statute. Mason v. Union Pacific 
Railway Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 796. 
(At rp,ag·e 781) ''This court in the case of 
Mason v. Union Pacific Ry. Co., 7 Utah 77, 24 P. 
796, held that the death statute, 104-3-11 of the 
R.S.U. 1933, was not a survival statute but that 
it created a new cause of action in the heirs. 
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The ~Iason case, supra, has since been approved 
in Halling Y. Industrial Commission of Utah, et 
v,l.~ 71 lTtah 112, 263 P. 78. '' 
Of ·bourse, suit could be maintained by the adminis-
trator of an estate of decedent, but the recovery for the 
"Tongful death \Yould not be subject to the debts of the 
decede:ih nor eXJl'enses of administration of the decedent's 
estate. In ·other words, the administrator \Y·ould be acting 
in a dual capacity, that is, as representative of the heirs 
in the wrongful death, and administrator of the deced-
ent's estate, and they definitely would have to be kept 
separate. 
To justify the appellant's actions throughout, he 
must justify his attempts to distribute the recovery for 
wrongful death according to our laws of distribution in 
probate. Appellant's brief has given us a ~art of the 
history of our wrongful death statute, but for some 
reason or other he has not given us h. complete history 
of the act. The Compiled Laws of Utah, 1888, Vol. 2, 
page 179, state: 
''Sec. 2961. Whenever the death of a person 
shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault, and the act, neglect or default is such as 
would, if death had not ensued, have entitled the 
party injured to maintain an action and recover 
damages in resp·ect thereof, then, and in every 
such case, the person who, or the com1)!any or 
corporation which would have been liable if death 
had not ensued, shall be liable to an action for 
damages, notwithstanding the death of the per-
son injured, and although the death shall have 
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been caused under such circumstances as amount 
in law to felony. 
"Sec. 2962. That every such action shall be 
brought by, and in the names of the personal 
representatives of such deceased person, and the 
amount received in every such action shall be 
distributed by direction and decree of the proper 
pro hate court, to such persons (other than cred-
itors) as are by law entitled to distributive shares 
of the estate of such deceased !person, and in 
such porportions as are prescribed by law. Pro-
vided, that every such action shall he commenced 
within two years after the death of such deceased 
lp1erson; and provided further, that the damages 
so recovered shall not in any case exceed the 
sum of ten thousand dollars. '' 
Thus, we see that at one time we had the method of 
distribution that app1ellant is now so ardently claiming 
is the only fit and proper procedure. However, the legis-
lature, in 1901, repealed section 2962. The legislature 
certainly did not rep·eal that section because it wanted to 
keep that method of distribution in force. 
The case of In Re Riccomi (Sup. Ct. Calif., 1921), 197 · 
P. 97, 14 A.L.R. 509, discusses this very question, and 
holds that it is the 1pecuniary loss to the heir by reason 
of the death· that is recoverable, and that only, and that 
it follows inevitably that there can he no substantial 
recovery on account of any heir who has not suffered 
any substantial pecuniary injury. The case at bar and 
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the Riceomi case seem to coincide in more than one way. 
We quote: 
· (At 14 A.L.R. 511) ''A review of the deci-
sions in this state under this statu tory provision 
makes it clear that the claim of the appellant is 
based upon a complete misconception of the settled 
construction of the statute and its purpose and 
object. · 
"It is settled that the action authorized by the 
section is -one solely for the benefit of the heirs, 
by which they may be compensated for the pecuni-
ary loss suffered by them by reason of the loss 
of their relatives. The money recovered consti-
tutes no part of the estate of deceased, and where 
the action is· brought or the money recovered by 
the personal representative of the deceased, such 
J?'ersonal representative is acting solely as a statu-
tory trustee for the benefit of the heirs on account 
of whom the recovery is had.'' 
There is another similarity in the two cases. We 
quote: 
(At page 513) "It is interesting to note that 
our original statute relative to actions of this 
character (Stat. 1862, p. 448) contained a provi-
sion directing distribution of the proceeds of the 
action to 'the widow and next of kin, in the 
proportions provided by law in relation to the 
distribution of personal proverty left by persons 
dying intestate', and that, when it came to the 
enactment of the Codes, the whole subject-matter 
was revised, and the direction as to distribution 
entirely omitted. ' ' 
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While In Re Riccomi, supra, may be the only author-
ity that is cited under appellant's quotation from 16 
A.m. Jur., Sec. 251, page 152, as authority that distribu-
tion, when not fixed by statute, shall be on the basis of 
the pecuniary loss sustained by the distributees, there 
are many other cases. See: Hurley v .. Hurley (Sup. Ct. 
Okla., 1942), 127 P. (2) 147; notes, annotation 14 A..L.R., 
page 516; Schultz v. Western Farm Tractor Company, 
190 P. 1007, 14 A..L.R. 514 and annotation. 
In the case of Murphy v. Duluth Superior Bus Com-
pany (Sup. Ct. Minn., 1937), 274 N.W. 515," 112 A.L.R. 27, 
the statute provided: 
(At page 29) ''The damages therein ... shall 
be for the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse 
and next of kin, to be distributed to them in the 
same, provp,ortion as personal property of persons 
dying intestate.'' (Italics supplied.) 
The statute governing distribution provided: 
(At page 29) ''If there be no issue nor spouse, 
the estate shall descend to the father and mother 
in equal shares, or if but one survive, then to 
such survivor.'' 
''In ordering one-half of the balance of the 
settlement money distributed to the res~ondent, 
the court was merely following the clear and 
express language of these statutes. It is true 
that the amount of recovery under section 9657 
is limited to the pecuniary loss of those for whose 
benefit action may be brought. Dunnell, Minn. 
Dig. (2d Ed.) Sec. 2617. And as a result, in the 
action to recover in this case for the death of the 
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boy, the damages \\~ould be limited to the pecuni-
ary loss of the appellant, since the respondent 
suffered no such loss because of his death.'' 
In this case, for the death of a child, the recovery 
was divided hetween the father and the mother. The 
father had divorced his wife when the child was young, 
and she lived separate and apart fron1 the child. He had 
borne the entire burden of SUlpport and care of the child, 
and the child never knew his mother as such, and the evi-
dence showed that she suffered no pecuniary damage. The 
Supreme Court upheld the decision of the lower court 
to award the mother half of the recovery. The court in 
discussing this case said: 
(At page 29) ''However, according to the 
provisions of section 9657, once the amount of 
the damages is determined and recovered, re-
spondent is entitled to one-half of that amount. 
To say that this is anomalous is somewhat of 
an understatement. There can be no better illus-
tration of how unjust the result may be than that 
reached in the instant case, but this inconsistency 
has been created by the Legislature and not the 
court. To reach a different result would violate 
the express wording ·of the statute. We have on 
at least two previous occasions considered these 
statutes with regard to this particular question.'' 
The court later in the opinion states : 
(At page 29) "An amendment to section 
9'657 to remedy this situation would seem to be 
most desirable. That is within the province of the 
Legislature and not the court.'' 
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As we have seen earlier in this argument, Utah and 
California did correct that situation by amendment. Of 
course, the court may use the laws of distribution in 
probate as a guide, and, in certain circumstances, per-
haps that method would furnish an equitable and just 
distribution. 
F.aulkner v. Faulkner (Sup. Ct. Ark., 1933), 57 S.W. 
(2) 818, quoted on page 47 of appellant's hrief, says: 
"The statute as inter1preted makes pecuniary 
injury the basis of damage and ·of the participa-
tion in any judgment recovered. The dependence 
of the plaintiff and whether or not the deceased 
had contributed to his support are merely eviden-
tiary facts from which, with other circumstances 
in the case, the question of the pecuniary injury 
and its ·extent is to ·be ascertained. The distribution 
not having been pre'scribed by the governing stat-
utes (Section 7138) and the mode named in section 
1075 not been applicable, it becomes the duty of 
the court to formulate .a rule of distribution con-
sonant with reason and the p1rinciples of sound 
justice. (Emphasis our own.) 
''It is not difficult to perceive how the rule 
1provided for in section 1075 or how any other 
fixed and arbitrary rule might be the occasion of 
an unfair division by which one in no sense in 
need and in every sense unworthy and who had 
received and had no right to expect any contribu-
tion would share equally with those entirely de-
pendent and most worthy and who- had in the 
lifetime of the deceased been the principal bene-
ficiaries of his bounty and had the right to expect 
that this would continue. • ~ * 
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~'It is clear that sin1ply because one is among 
the number of next of kin does not entitle him to 
recover damages or share \vith the others, but it 
must app,ear that some pecuniary injury to him 
must haYe been suffered. If then the injury suf-
fered is the basis ·of the recovery, the extent of 
that injury, as compared ,,'Jth others of the next 
of kin, ought to be the measure by which his 
proportionate share in the damages recovered 
should be ascertained. '' 
Let us see what In Re Aronowitz, 272 N.Y.S. 421, 
cited in appellant's brief at 1page 45, says: 
''The facts of the present case serve as a strik-
ing illustration of the inequity frequently pro-
duced by this vrocedure. Here the husband was 
80 years of age at the time of the accident. His 
expectancy of life was but 4.39 years. If this be 
assumed that the age ·of one child was 20 and of 
the other 25, their expectancies were 42.20 and 
39.49 years respectively. Since the decedent was 
56 years old at the time of her death, her expec-
tancy of life was 16.72 years. It is obvious, there-
fore, that, all other factors being equal, the loss 
from the death was approximately four times as 
great for each of the children, as for the widower, 
and that, viewed from this standpoint, any recov-
ery should be divided approximately into ninths, 
with four thereof being payable to each child and 
only one to the husband. Under section 133 of this 
statute, however, the direction is mandatory that 
'the damages recovered . . . must be distributed 
. . . as if they were unbequeathed assets . . . '; 
in other "\Vords, that the regular devolution pre-
scribed by the statute of distribution governs, 
which in this case gives one-third to the husband 
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and a like proportion to each child. Decedent 
Estate Law, P. 83, subd. 1. 
"It would not be difficult to imagine even 
more striking inconsistencies in the application 
of the law by its diversion in distribution to one 
person of sums which were in . reality awarded 
as compensation for the loss of another. The 
remedy for the condition is, however, a legisla-
tive, and not a judicial, function.'' 
In Snedeker v. Snedeke,r (1900) 164 N.Y. 458, 58 
N. E. 4, cited at page 48 of appellant's brief, the court 
said: 
''We are not insensible to the peculiar hard-
ship of this case, where a widow, left without 
means of support, is compelled to divide the net 
amount of the judgment she has recovered a,..s 
administratrix with a man of means (the father 
of the deceased), possessed of considerable real 
and ~personal property. We must, however, con-
strue the law as it is written, regardless of the 
seeming injustice inflicted in particular cases by 
the existing rule.'' 
Counsel for appellant seems to he as confused over 
the words, "pecuniary loss", as he was over our wrong-
ful death statute. He quotes on page 55 of his brief from 
Ev(JJJts v. Oregon Short Line R:a·ilroad Co., 37 U. 431, 108 
P. 638: 
'' * * * the jury should be admonished that in 
no event can the pecuniary necessities or the vhy-
sical requirements of the wife or children be con-
sidered for the purpose of ·enhancing the damages 
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which \Yere caused by the negligent act complained 
of.'' 
He seems to be confused bet,veen the action for wrong-
ful death and the distribution. Certainly if a father, 
"~ho \Yas a hopteless cripple and very aged and had con-
tributed nothing to,Yards his children's support, and 
\Yho only had a life expectancy of a few months, should 
be killed by wrongful act, the defendant would not be 
required to 1pay a great amount of damages merely 
because the ,,rife and children happened to be in dire 
need and in poor physical condition. However, as was 
pointed out in the case cited by respondent, after recov-
ery is made the physical conditions and pecuniary neces-
sities of the heirs may be taken into consideration to 
determine the distribution of the recovery. 
On page 57 of his brief, appellant states: 
''Obviously, if an heir is entitled to his pro-
portionate share, it must he in the proportion 
that he is a~ heir, otherwise the action would not 
be for his benefit as an heir." 
The proportion means according to the iproportion of the 
heir's pecuniary loss, and it has been so held in Faulkner 
v. Faulkner, supra, Snedeker v. Snedeker, supra, and 
Hurley v. Hurley, supra. 
Appellant complains about the lower court failing 
to fix any pecuniary los·s for the p-rotestant, Edward C. 
Behm, the father of the children. Behm did not object, 
and, if there were any error in the court's ruling, it is 
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certainly not the privilege of the appellant to raise that 
question. Edward C. Behm would probably have been 
entitled to a_portion of the recovery and also the amount 
expended for medical services and funeral eXJpenses for 
the dece~ased. He stated that he was willing that all of 
the recovery go to the two babies. Behm has not cross-
~ppealed and he accepted the ruling of the court in that 
regard. 
While the respondent does not approve of Alma Gee 
receiving $750.00 quantum meruit, he did not raise any 
objection. He was anxious to settle -and end this litiga-
tion without having all ~of it dissipated in expensive 
court proceedings. The lower court recognized the rule 
that even in champertous contracts with attorneys, the 
attorney is still entitled to quantum meruit, and while in 
this case the lower court allowed $750.00, "rhich was far 
in excess of any services rendered by Alma Gee, that 
finding was not complained of by the respondent. Ordin-
arily, in the cases that eome up every month in our 
District Court, the special rerrxr;esentative, who is merely 
a figurehead, is generally a younger lawyer in the firm's 
office, :and on recoveries ranging from $30,000.00 to 
$100,000.00 the special administrator or representative 
or trustee, call him what you will, is paid from $50.00 
to $75.00. 
The wppellant occupies much space in his brief set-
ting forth the faithful, hard work and the value of the 
services of Alma Gee, the appellant, hut he lets the cat 
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out of the bag in his petition for approval to settle the 
case against Doctor Holbrook. See Paragraph 3 (R. 11): 
"That through the efforts of your petitioner's 
attorney, Shirley P. Jones, the said Dr. Von G. 
Holbrook has offered to pay to your petitioner 
* * * " 
' 
and that is exactly what it was. The recovery was made 
solely through the efforts of Attorney Jones. The testi-
mony of \\Titness Jones about the countless consultations 
he had with this 63-year-old watchman about technical, 
medical problems is absurd on the face of it. Alma Gee's 
salary was $150.00 a month. The lower court allowed 
him $750.00 quantum meruit. Alma Gee s1pent approxi-
mately $30.00, some of it uselessly, such as notice to 
creditors. That left him $720.00, or more than he made 
in four months as a watchman. The record does not 
disclose that Mr. Gee lost a single, solitary day of his 
work on account of his efforts as administrator, special 
representative or trustee, whatever a;ppellant's attor-
neys wish to label him. 
Appellant claims that Alma Gee was entitled to 
the S'ame compensation as an attorney in this matter. 
Respondent feels that the time-honored custom of attor-
neys paying their investigators out of their fees should 
not be disturbed, ·and the respondent believes that the 
client should receive at least a portion of the recovery. 
The app1ellant complains of the $500.00 distributed 
to ~ir. Behm for the use and benefit of his attorneys, 
claiming that nothing was done. This 1nuch was accom-
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plished: An attempt to take an additional attorney's 
fee and administrator's fee was blocked. N otwithstand-
ing appellant's disclaimer of attorneys' fees in the 
appeal, the record clearly shows the appellant's inten-
tions in that regard. The attempt to take $3,750.00 from 
the fund by reason of a pretended assignment was 
foiled, and $10,500.00 was recovered for the benefit of 
those entitled to it. 
POINT I. 
THE VALIDITY oF THE AssiGNMENT, ExHIBIT 6. 
(A) Assignability of Behm's Share of any Recovery. 
The cause of action for wrongful death is non-
assignable. 
In the early case of Fritz v. Western Union Tele-
u.·~aph ·Company, et al. (1903), 25 U. 263, 71 P. 209, on 
p1age 280 of the Utah Reports: 
''While we do not think that such an assign-
ment can be valid or of any effect, yet, even if it 
were, still the real party vointed out by the 
statute, to-wit, the personal representative of the 
deceased, brought this action, and a judgment 
herein will be a complete bar to any action now 
or hereafter brought by the heirs or their 
assignee. Rev. St., sec. 2912. Besides, this ob-
jection was urged too late, and must be held to 
have been waived. 'The objection that the plain-
tiff in an action is not the real p·arty in interest, 
as required by the Code, when available by way 
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of defense, must be raised by demurrer or answer, 
or it will be considered to haYe been waived.' '' 
''r e also depend on the case of Johanson v. Cudahy 
Packing Con~pany, 100 U. 399, 115 P. (2) 794, 101 U. 219, 
120 P. (2) 281, and 107 U. 114, 152 P. (2) 98. 
Corptus JHris Secundum, Vol. 6, page 1082, section 
33, states: 
''In the absence of statutory modification, a 
cause of action for death by 'vrongful act is not 
assignable, and it has been held that, prior to 
verdict or judgment, the beneficiary's claim for 
damages is a mere expectancy, or inchoate right, 
not a debt, and not assignable.'' 
The law does not preclude an assignment of the 
claim to a representative or an administrator for the 
purpose of bringing a suit, the recovery, of course, to be 
held in trust for the heirs. It would be an anomalous 
situation for a stranger to the action, who has suffered 
no pecuniary loss, who was not an heir, to he able to 
recover damages in an action for wrongful death. Even 
a creditor cannot maintain such an action. 
Now, let us see what appellant did in this matter. 
In Case No. 80962, Alma Gee, admr., etc. v .. Von G. Hol-
brook, which was introduced in evidence, paragraph 10 
of the complaint reads as follows: 
"That as a result of the negligence and care-
lessness as aforesaid the said heirs of the said 
deceased and the said estate of the said deceased 
incurred funeral expenses in the sum of $1000.00, 
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and were damaged in the total sum of $26,000.00, 
and the plaintiff brings this action for the benefit 
of said heirs.'' 
This was signed and filed after the execution of the 
assignment, E~hi1bit 6. Why didn't the aJpi>ellant state in 
said paragraph: ''and 1plaintiff brings this action for 
the benefit of said minor children, Venna Julene Behm 
and Cheryl Darlene Behm and Alma Gee, as assignee 
of Edward C. Behm, the father"~ Witness Jones testi-
fied that Edward C. Behm was out of it before this suit 
was filed. What would then have been Alma Gee's basis 
of recovery or pecuniary loss~ No, Lord Campbell's 
Act never was enacted for the purpose of compensating 
strangers or people who might make it a practice to go 
around getting assignments of another's right of action 
or the proceeds of the recovery. 
Personally, we cannot see the difference between the 
assignment of the right of action and the assignment of 
the proceeds of recovery, except !perhrups the latter 
would deprive a defendant in a suit for wrongful death 
of the defense that the person asking recovery suffered 
no loss. Clearly the assignment was void on the face of it. 
(B) There was not only an actual fraud perp,etra:ted 
by Alma Gee in this oase upon the protestant, Edw~ard C. 
Behm, but there was an equitable fraud by reason of the 
trust and confidence .a.rising out of the relationship exist-
ing betw·een Alma Gee and Edward C. Behm, and there-
fo·re, Alm.a Gee has the burden of establishing that' the 
assignment, Exhibit 6, w.as obtained in good faith and 
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under circunzstances excluding wndue influence, decez~t, 
or any 11nprope r nz ewns. 
The Utah Supreme Court is committed to the doc. 
trine that fraud is presumed in transactions between 'per-
sons occlllp~ng a fiduciary relation, and the party bene-
fited has the burden to show that the transaction was 
fair. 
Omega Inv. Co. v. ~woolley (1928), 72 Utah 
474, 271 P. 797. 
The question arises: Did a confidential relation exist 
in this case at bar~ Alma Gee was the f·ather-in-law of 
Edward C. Behm. Edward C. Behm had full faith and 
confidence in his father-in-law; that he was called to the 
office of Attorney Jones on April 11, 1947; that Alma 
Gee had seen Attorney Jones before; that they submitted 
to Behm the petition for administrator and for guardian-
ship. He had faith and confidence in Alma Gee and 
consented that Gee be guardian of the estates of the 
minors. He consented that Alma Gee be the special rep-
resentative or administrator in whose name the doctor 
was to be sued. Witness Jones claimed he informed 
Behm concerning the assignment at that time on April11, 
1947. This Behm denied. The court evidently believed 
Witness Behm and evidently disbelieved Witness Gee 
and Witness Jones. Finding No. 4 states there was no 
consideration given Edward C. Behm by said Alma Gee 
for said assignment, and Edward C. Behm did not fully 
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comprehend the import ·of said assignment, and he had 
not been fully and completely instructed as to his rights 
in said matter (R. 57). 
At the time Exhibit 6 was. signed, Behm had already 
petitioned for the ap1pointment of Alma Gee as his spe-
cial representative and trustee. It is clear that :prior to 
the execution of Exhibit '6 Alma Gee had assumed to 
act in the matter and take charge of the affairs concern-
ing the suit against Doctor Holbrook. He had before 
that time procured the attorney, Shirley P. Jones. He 
had had the papers prepared. Under such circumstances, 
it is clear that there was a confidence genera ted in 
Behm's mind, repos-ed by him in his father-in-law, Alma 
Gee, and he furthermore was acting in a fiduciary capac-
ity. It in no manner or at all lessens his obligation 
because he had not then been actually appointed by the 
court. The assignment itself stated that he had instituted 
and will continue to carry on further proceedings for the 
recovery of said estate, etc. 
The Supreme Court of Utah in the case of Omega 
lnv. ;Co. v. Woolley, sUJpra, states: 
''A confidential relation exists when confidence 
is reposed by one party and a trust accepted by 
the other, when a confidence has been imposed 
and betrayed, or when influence has been acquired 
and abused. It embraces both technical and :fidu-
ciary relations and those informal relations where 
one man trusts in and relies on another. Dale v. 
Jennings, 90 Fla. 234, 107 So. 175. '' 
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The Supreme Court of Utah quoted from Pomeroy 
on Jurisprudence as follows: 
''The doctrine of equity concerning undue 
influence is very broad, and is based up1on princi-
tples of the highest morality. It reaches every 
case, and grants relief 'where influence is acquired 
and abused, or where confidence is reposed and 
betrayed'. It is specially active and searching 
in dealing with gifts, but is applied, when neces-
sary, to conveyances, contracts executory and 
executed, and 'vills. '' 
2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurwp~udence, Sec. 951. 
The Court then held that where a confidential rela-
tion was shown to exist, the burden rested upon the 
party benefited by the transaction or the transfer to show 
that the fullest and fairest explanation and communica-
tion was made to the party reposing such confidence, and 
that the transaction itself was fair and th·e consideration 
therefor adequate, before a court is justified in permitting 
such a transaction or assignment to stand. 
The court said, again quoting from Pomeroy: 
''Courts of equity have carefully refrained 
from defining the particular instances of fiduciary 
relations in such a manner that other and perhaps 
new cases might be excluded. It is settled by an 
overwhelming weight of authority that the prin-
ciple extends to every possible case in which a 
fiduciary relation exists as a fact, in which there 
is confidence reposed on one side, and the result-
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ing superiority and influence on the other. The 
relation and the duties involved in it need not 
be legal; it may be moral, social, domestic, or 
merely personal. '' 
2 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Sec. 956; 
74 Utah 486. 
In Odell v. Moss, 130 Cal. 352, 62 P. 555 (1900), it 
appeared that a brother had deeded certain property to 
his sister. It aplleared that he reposed confidence in that 
sister, and the Supreme Court of California held that 
under th·e circumstances the transaction was construc-
tively fraudulent', and that the burden was upon the sister 
of proving affirmatively that influence was not used 
to obtain the deed. The court pointed out that the rela-
tionship of brother and sister was not in itself a fidu-
~~ .. -
ciary relation, but that it was a material circumstance 
in considering the question whether in fact such a rela-
tion existed. 
The court said : 
'' The evidence on this point, we think, clearly 
establishes the fiduciary relation. It is ex:pressly 
found by the court that by reason of the relation 
existing between them, the defendant 'reposed in 
plain tiff especial confidence and trust'. ( 62 P. 
556)'' . 
In the case at. bar, it is clear that Edward C. B·ehm 
reposed great confidence in his father-in-law, Alma Gee, 
at the time he signed the petition for guardianship and 
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the petition for appointment of Alma Gee as adininis-
trator at the office of Shirley P. Jones on Aprilll, 1947, 
and that he reposed great confidence in him when he 
signed Exhibit 6 on the 28th day of Arpril, 1947. 
On page 28 of app~ellant's brief, the assignment IS 
referred to and it states: 
''The 'Assignment' is here in evidence and 
demonstrates that any school boy upon reading 
it would understand it. 
Let us see whether or not it is understandable : 
''Exhibit 6 
''Edward C. Behm, the husband of the above 
entitled deceased, for a valuable consideration 
~t~o for the further consideration that Alma Gee, the 
father of said deceased, has instituted and will 
continue to carry on further proceedings for the 
recovery for said estate of anything due it for 
the death of said deceased, and particularly any-
thing due the minor children of. the undersigned, 
and the said deceased does hereby assign, transfer 
and set over unto the said Alma Gee all his right, 
title, claim and interest in and to the said estate, 
the proceeds thereof, and particularly the pro-
ceeds of any recovery made or recovered from 
Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery made or re-
covered for the death of said deceased. It is 
expressly understood that the said minor children 
shall receive their full share of said estate free 
and clear of this assignment to be administrated 
under the guardianship proceedings heretofore 
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instituted on their behalf by the said Alma Gee 
with the consent of the undersigned. 
"Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 28th day 
of April, 1947. 
(Signed) EDWARD C. BERM 
Witness: (Signed) AMY C. GEE 
(Signed) JULENE GEE." 
It states : ''Alma Gee * * * has instituted and will 
continue to carry on further proceedings for the recovery 
for said estate of anything due it for the death of said 
deceased''. A school boy would be misled, because the 
recovery was not for the estate; it was for the heirs. 
''And particularly anything due the minor children of the 
undersigned". Why was that put in~ Appell~ant has in-
sisted all along that the father had a one-third share. It 
may be clear to any school hoy, but it is not clear to the 
writer why that particular emphasis should be ·placed 
upon the children, unless it was to convince the father, 
Edward C. Behm, that this action was solely for the 
benefit of the children. 
And on line 7 it states: ''and the said deceased 
(emphasis added) does hereby assign, transfer and set 
over unto the said Alma Gee all his right, title, claim 
and interest in and to the said estate, the proceeds there-
of, and particularly the 1proceeds of any recovery made 
or recovered from Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery 
made or recovered for the death of said deceased". He 
would have to be a Phi Beta K'B{Ppa school boy to figure 
that one out. 
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Then 'Ye come down to: ''It is expTessly understood 
that the said minor children shall receive their full share 
of said estate free and clear of this assignment to be 
administrated under the gu·a.rdianship proceedings here-
tofore instituted on their behalf by the said Alma Gee 
with the consent of the undersigned". What does that 
mean 1 Would any school boy know what that means~ 
What "~as their share~ Why was that put in~ W·as that 
merely again to reassure Edward C. Behm, the father of 
said children, that this action was merely for the benefit of 
the children J? I am afraid that Attorney Jones has either 
gi\en more credit to the simpJicity of this masterpiece of 
malapropism than it deserves, or he has credited the 
school boy with undue perspicacity. 
The above assignment is exactly as set out. 
''Deceased'' is not a printer's mistake. Neither Behm, 
Gee, nor Attorney Jones knew what Exhibit 6 meant. 
~fr. Perry in his work upon Trusts, Volume 1, dis-
cusses at gr_eat length the ru1es relative to constructive 
trusts and constructive fraud. On ~page 352, section 205, 
he says: 
''The same principles apvly to attempted pur-
chases by administrators and executors of the 
estate under their charge to administer. When 
the purchase is directly from beneficiaries of their 
interests, or when the purchase is assented to by 
all the beneficiaries, the executor or administrator 
has the burden of showing that the beneficiaries 
selling or those assenting to his purchase kne'v 
that he was the purchaser and were fully informed 
by him of everything which might influence them 
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in selling their interests or assenting to his pur-
chase of the property, and that no undue influence 
was used by him and no unfairness practiced.'' 
And again: 
"This rule is so strict, that they cannot pur-
chase any of the assets of the estate under their 
charge, although the assets are ordered by the 
court to be sold at public auction." 
I 
In re Robertson's Estate, 1 N.Y.S. (2d) 423 (1938). 
This was a decision by the surrogate court of New 
York and was a proceeding in the matter of the estate 
of a deceased. person. It involved the validity of an 
assignment. 
"An assignment made by a distributee to au 
administrator or to one about to become an ad-
ministrator of an estate, should be set aside when 
procured through false representation.'' 
In this case the surrogate court quotes the language 
of Judge Cardozo as follows: 
''A trustee is held to something stricter than 
the morals of the market ~lace. Not honesty 
alone, but the ~punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive, 'is then the standard of behavior. As to 
this there has developed a tradition that is un-
bending and inveterate. Uncompromising rigidity 
has been the attitude of courts of equity when 
petitioned to undermine the rule of undivided 
loyalty by the 'disintegrating erosion' of par-
ticular exceptions. Wendt v. Fischer, 243 N. Y. 
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439, 444, 154 NE 303. Only thus has the level of 
conduct for fiduciaries been kept at a level higher 
than that trodden by the cro,Yd. It 'vill not con-
sciously be lo'\vered by any judgment of this 
court.'' 
Was Behm fully informed either by Alma Gee or by 
~fr. Jones·~ Absolutely not. Mr. Jones all through this 
case has acted as the {Personal attorney for Alma Gee, 
rather than for the heirs. He owed a duty to keep them 
all fully informed. He knew when he prepared Exhibit 
6 that he was attempting to prepare an instrument that 
would assign a valuable right of Edward C. Behm to 
Alma Gee. It was his duty to inf.orm Behm fully as to 
\Yhat he thought the purport of Exhibit 6 was. Not only 
did Attorney Jones fail to enlighten Edward C. Behm 
fully, but he failed to keep him informed as to the prog-
ress of the case, and gave him the brush-off when he, 
Behm, went to Jones' office with what he, Behm, thought 
was valuable information. 
Neither Attorney Jones nor Gee notified Behm that 
a settlement had been made. It seems strange indeed 
that the petition for administrator and the petition for 
guardian were ready and waiting for Behm in Attorney 
Jones' office, but this comvlicated, misleading instru-
ment, termed an "assignment", Exhibit 6, was sent some 
two weeks later by Attorney Jones with Alma Gee to 
be signed away from an attorney's office. Witness Jones 
testified that when he had the petition for administrator 
and guardian signed, he took Behm in to another attor-
ney, Gordon Strong, and explained the situation in front 
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of Mr. Strong. It seems strange indeed that a transaction 
of the importance of this one, signing Exhibit 6, and it 
appears that Witness Jones and Witness Gee knew of 
its importance, was not deserving of formal and regular 
attention; they, knowing that Behm was signing over 
all of his rights to Gee in this substantial matter, should 
have seen to it that this man Behm was taken before 
some disinterested attorney who would fully explain the 
contents of the instrument and its legal effect. 
Yes, if this Exhibit 6 is considered as a contract, 
then clearly the exhibit itself is conclusive and decisive 
evidence of fraud, but this exhibit and its execution is 
coupled with other inequitable incidents. These inci-
dents operate to throw the burden of proof on the party, 
Alma Gee in this case, seeking to reap the benefits of 
this action, and this burden of proof requires that Alma 
Gee show that Edward C. Behm acted voluntarily, know-
ingly, intentionally, and deliberately, and with the full 
knowledge of the nature and effects of his acts, and that 
his consent was not obtained by any oppression, undue 
influence or undue advantage taken of his condition, 
situation or necessities. 
2 Pomeroy's EquityJuris!p,rudence, page 1671. 
Finding such fiduciary relationship existing between 
the [p~arties, then the burden is upon Alma Gee to establish 
that Behm acted voluntarily, and that he knowingly and 
intentionally and deliberately gave his interest in the 
proceeds of the recovery for the wrongful death to Alma 
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Gee. It must be established that he kne"T "\Yhat he was 
giving, and if the proof fails, as it does fail, to show this 
intentional, deliberate act of B·ehm, then equity presumes 
what is known as a constructiYe fraud, even though Alma 
Gee hin1self acted in good faith and '"'ith good intention. 
Constructive fraud does not depend upon the evil 
intent of the person charged with such fraud, hut it rests 
upon broad grounds of public policy to accomplish the 
end of protecting society in general. Men are not per-
mitted to abuse confidence, and when the relation is such 
that the confidence is reposed by one person in another, 
then, unless the one in whom the confidence is reposed 
shall show that the transaction is fair and intentional in 
every resp,ect, equity conclusively presumes what it calls 
"constructive fraud". It is perfectly possible for an 
attorney to m·ake a purchase from his client in perfect 
good faith, or an administrator to buy the interest of an 
heir in the best of faith. The transactions can be as 
beneficial to the parties concerned as any other regular 
trans·action, but an attorney or an administrator who 
engages in such a transaction is treading upon dangerous 
ground for the reason that such contracts are prima 
facie fraudulent. 
This contract in this case is prima facie fraudulent. 
The danger of allowing such transactions to stand is that 
if once the door is opened, then attorneys, administrators, 
special representatives, and many others will enter at 
that opening and great frauds will he committed and 
unconscionable contracts will be made. 
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a :person agreeing to accept a part of the proceeds 
of a suit which he under guise of philanthropy 
is to aid in prosecuting is guilty of champerty. 
However, the assignment of a cause of action not 
otherwise champertous is not made so by lack 
of a full money consideration when the transfer 
is between father and son, or brother and brother.'' 
McClellan v. Oliver, 181 S.W. (2) 784, 238 Mo. Ap'p. 
409, states: 
''Though persons closely bound by ties of 
blood, family or affection may assist each other 
in litigation in an honorable way, they may not 
do so for gain of a part of the matter litigated. 
''A contract to assist in litigation for a share 
in the proceeds need not be entered into with bad 
motives in order to be against public policy and 
void.'' 
(The above case is where a brother and sister 
contracted to join cases on adoption and S'plit 
proceeds.) 
Further, quoting from 14 C.J.S. 369, sec. 27: 
"Provided he does not do so for the purpose 
of sp,eculation, a kinsman of a suitor may render 
aid in the prosecution or defense of a suit without 
being guilty of champerty or maintenance. 
''A person who is related by ties of consan-
guinity or affinity to either of the parties to a 
suit may rightfully assist in the prosecution or 
defense of such suit either by furnishing counsel 
or by contributing to the expense thereof; but the 
reason for the rule ceases and the rule is not 
applicable where a kinsman meddles in or main-
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tains the suit for the purpose of 1personal specu-
lation or profit. Otherwise stated, relationships 
by blood or marriage may justify maintenance, 
but not champerty." 
Thus we see that the assignment, Exhibit 6, along 
with all its other infirmities is also champertous, and the 
lower court very properly made its finding to that effect. 
CON~CLUSION 
We submit that the appellant certainly has no cause 
to complain of the rulings of the lower court in this 
matter. The allowance by the lower court to Alma Gee 
of $750.00 which he had unlawfully appropriated was 
much more than he was entitled to. The fact that the 
lower court did not se·e fit to allow Behm more than 
$500.00 in this recovery is no concern of the appellant. 
Behm was willing that the balance of the money go to 
the children. The fact that appellant's attorney feels 
that it would be dissipated by a trust comT'any has no 
hearing in the case. In passing, we might comment that 
the attorney himself, while a witness on the stand, testi-
fied that he once said, "I agreed with you that the trust 
company should be the one that would handle this money 
for the children and that that would be satisfactory with 
me'' (R. 188). 
The record shows conclusively that from the begin-
ning there was a misconception of the law. The claim for 
wrongful death was treated as belonging to the estate, 
even to the extent of [J'ro bate proceedings and the belief 
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that what was left of the fund recover·ed from the doctor 
,should be subject to estate attorney's fees, administra-
tor's fees and claims of creditors. 
The evidence shows beyond a peradventure of a 
doubt that the complicated, unintelligible instrument, 
labeled an assignment, was void on its face. It attempted 
to assign something that could not be assigned. It was 
champ·ertous and totally without consider·ation, and there 
was an equit,able fraud perpetrated by Alma Gee in this 
case upon the protestant, Edward C. Behm, and Alma 
Gee failed in his burden of establishing that the assign-
ment, Exhibit 6, was obtained in good faith and under 
circumstances excluding undue influence, deceit, or other 
1mpr01per means. 
Therefore, the judgment of the lower court should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
·C. VERNON LANGLOIS, 
RAY :s. McCARTY 
Attorneys for Protestant 
and Resvp:ondent 
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